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GSWF is monotone and balanced and the distribution of the
preferences is uniform, then the probability of a rational outcome
is at least 3/4, proving a conjecture raised by Kalai. The tools used
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functions on the discrete cube, properties of the Bonamie–Beckner
noise operator, and the FKG inequality.
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1. Introduction
Consider a situation in which a society of n members selects a ranking amongst m alternatives. In
the election process, each member of the society gives a ranking of the alternatives (the ranking is a
full linear ordering; that is, indifference between alternatives is not allowed). The set of the rankings
given by the individual members is called a proﬁle. Given the proﬁle, the ranking of the society is
determined according to some function, called a generalized social welfare function (GSWF).
The GSWF is a function F : Ln → {0,1}(m2) , where L is the set of linear orderings on m elements.
In other words, given the proﬁle consisting of linear orderings supplied by the voters, the function
determines the preference of the society amongst each of the
(m
2
)
pairs of alternatives. If the output
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of F can be represented as a full linear ordering of the m alternatives, then F is called a social welfare
function (SWF).
Throughout this paper we consider GSWFs satisfying the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA)
condition: For every two alternatives A and B , the preference of the entire society between A and B
depends only on the preference of each individual voter between A and B . This natural condition on
GSWFs can be traced back to de Condorcet [5].
The Condorcet’s paradox demonstrates that if the number of alternatives is at least three and the
GSWF is based on the majority rule between every pair of alternatives, then there exist proﬁles for
which the voting procedure cannot yield a full order relation. That is, there exist alternatives A, B ,
and C , such that the majority of the society prefers A over B , the majority prefers B over C , and the
majority prefers C over A. Such situation is called irrational choice of the society. Arrow’s impossibility
theorem [1] asserts that if a GSWF on at least three alternatives satisﬁes the IIA condition, has all the
possible orderings of the alternatives in its range, and is not a dictatorship (that is, the preference of
the society is not determined by a single member), then there exists a proﬁle for which the choice of
the society is irrational.
Since the existence of proﬁles leading to an irrational choice has signiﬁcant implications on voting
procedures, an extensive research has been conducted in order to evaluate the probability of irrational
choice for various GSWFs. Most of the results in this area are summarized in [8]. In addition to its
signiﬁcance in Social Choice theory, this area of research leads to interesting questions in probabilistic
and extremal combinatorics (see [15]).
In 2002, Kalai [10] suggested an analytic approach to this study. He showed that for GSWFs on
three alternatives satisfying the IIA condition, the probability of irrational choice can be computed
by a formula related to the Fourier–Walsh expansion of the GSWF. Using this formula he presented a
new proof of Arrow’s impossibility theorem under additional assumption of neutrality and established
upper bounds on the probability of irrational choice for speciﬁc classes of GSWFs.
In this paper we generalize the results of [10] in several directions. As in [10], we focus on GSWFs
on three alternatives satisfying the IIA condition. We denote the alternatives by A, B , and C , and the
choice functions amongst the pairs (A, B), (B,C), and (C, A) by f , g , and h, respectively (see Fig. 1).
We examine GSWFs satisfying (some of) the following conditions:
• Balance – A GSWF is balanced if the choice functions f , g, and h are balanced (i.e., satisfy E[ f ] =
E[g] = E[h] = 1/2).
• Neutrality – A GSWF is neutral if it is invariant under permutations of the alternatives. In partic-
ular, this implies that the choice functions satisfy f = g = h, and that f is balanced.
• Symmetry – We call a GSWF symmetric if it is invariant under a transitive group of permutations
of the voters. In particular, this implies that the choice functions are far from a dictatorship.2
• Monotonicity – A GSWF is monotone if the choice functions f , g, and h are monotone increasing.3
2 Note that this deﬁnition of symmetry is much weaker than the usual deﬁnition requiring that the function depends only
on the Hamming weight of the input. Important classes of functions, including the tribes functions [3], satisfy our deﬁnition of
symmetry.
3 The deﬁnition of a monotone increasing function on the discrete cube is given is Section 4.
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preferences. In [10] it is assumed that the individual preferences are independent and uniformly dis-
tributed. We show that the results of [10] are valid (under some modiﬁcations) also for non-uniform
distributions of the preferences, as long as the voters are independent, and for each ordering of the
alternatives, the probability of the ordering is equal to the probability of the inverse ordering. We
call such distributions even product distributions. In particular, we prove the following generalization of
Theorem 5.1 of [10]:
Theorem 1.1. Consider a GSWF on three alternatives satisfying the IIA condition. If the distribution of the
preferences is an even product distribution such that the probability of each preference is positive, and the GSWF
is neutral and symmetric, then the probability of irrational choice is bounded away from zero, independently
of the number of the voters.4
The second direction is obtaining new lower bounds on the probability of a rational choice for
several classes of GSWFs. In particular, we prove the following conjecture raised in [10]:
Theorem 1.2. Consider a GSWF on three alternatives satisfying the IIA condition. If the individual preferences
are independent and uniformly distributed, and the GSWF is monotone and balanced, then the probability of a
rational choice is at least 3/4.
The proof of this result relies on properties of the Bonamie–Beckner noise operator and uses the
FKG inequality [7]. Furthermore, we establish a generalization of Theorem 1.2 to even product distri-
butions of the individual preferences.
Finally, we consider the stability version of Arrow’s theorem presented in [10]. This version asserts
that if a balanced GSWF on three alternatives satisﬁes the IIA condition and is at least -far from
being a dictatorship, then it leads to irrational choice with probability at least C ·  , for a universal
constant C . Kalai asked whether his proof technique can be extended to an analytic proof of Arrow’s
theorem without the neutrality assumption, or even to a stability version of Arrow’s theorem. (Such
version would assert that for any  > 0, there exists δ = δ() such that if a GSWF on at least three
candidates satisﬁes the IIA condition and is at least δ-far from being a dictatorship and from not
having all the orderings of the alternatives in its range, then the probability of irrational choice is at
least  .)
We show that the neutrality assumption cannot be dropped completely from Kalai’s result, that is,
there does not exist a stability version of Arrow’s theorem (with no additional assumptions) in which
the dependence of δ() on  is linear.
Theorem 1.3. For all , K > 0 and n = n(, K ) big enough, there exists a GSWF on three alternatives satisfying
the IIA condition, such that:
1. Amongst any pair of alternatives, the probability of each alternative to be preferred by the society over the
other alternative is at least η = 2−n/(n + 1).
2. The probability of an irrational choice is less than η/K .
The example that proves Theorem 1.3 is a GSWF on three alternatives in which the choice func-
tions f , g, and h are threshold functions (i.e., ( f (x) = 1) ⇔ (∑ni=1 xi  k)), with expectations η, 1/2,
and 1− η.
After this paper was written, a stability version of Arrow’s theorem without additional assumptions
was proved by Mossel [16]. In Mossel’s theorem, the dependence of δ on  is δ =m2 · exp(C/21) for
a universal constant C , where m is the number of alternatives. Recently, Keller [12] showed that the
4 In the context of this theorem, “bounded away” means that the probability is greater than a constant, depending only on
the distribution of the preferences, and not on the number of voters and the choice functions. Theorem 5.1 in [10] states that
if the preferences are distributed uniformly, then the value of this constant is at least 0.0808.
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for small values of  , the example presented above (i.e., the threshold functions) is almost optimal: its
probability of irrational choice is greater than the lower bound at most by a logarithmic factor (in ).
The paper is organized as follows: In Section 2 we recall some basic properties of the Fourier–
Walsh expansion of functions on the discrete cube and of the Bonamie–Beckner noise operator. In
Section 3 we generalize the results of [10] to even product distributions of the preferences and prove
Theorem 1.1. In Section 4 we establish lower bounds on the probability of a rational choice for several
classes of GSWFs and prove Theorem 1.2. In Section 5 we discuss Kalai’s stability version of Arrow’s
theorem and prove Theorem 1.3.
2. Preliminaries
2.1. Fourier–Walsh expansion of functions on the discrete cube
Consider the discrete cube {0,1}n endowed with the uniform measure μ. Denote the set of all
real-valued functions on the discrete cube by X . The inner product of functions f , g ∈ X is deﬁned as
usual as
〈 f , g〉 = Eμ[ f g] = 1
2n
∑
x∈{0,1}n
f (x)g(x).
This inner product induces a norm on X :
‖ f ‖2 =
√〈 f , f 〉 =√Eμ[ f 2].
Consider the Rademacher functions {ri}ni=1, deﬁned as:
ri(x1, . . . , xn) = 2xi − 1.
These functions constitute an orthonormal system in X . Moreover, this system can be completed to
an orthonormal basis in X by deﬁning
rS =
∏
i∈S
ri,
for all S ⊂ {1, . . . ,n}. Every function f ∈ X can be represented by its Fourier expansion with respect
to the system {rS}S⊂{1,...,n}:
f =
∑
S⊂{1,...,n}
〈 f , rS〉rS .
This representation is called the Fourier–Walsh expansion of f . The coeﬃcients in this expansion are
denoted by
fˆ (S) = 〈 f , rS〉,
and the level of the coeﬃcient fˆ (S) is |S|.
By the Parseval identity, for all f ∈ X ,∑
S⊂{1,...,n}
fˆ (S)2 = ‖ f ‖22.
More generally, for all f , g ∈ X ,
〈 f , g〉 =
∑
S⊂{1,...,n}
fˆ (S)gˆ(S).
Following [10], we will be also interested in a biased version of the inner product, deﬁned as follows:
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〈〈 f , g〉〉δ =
∑
S 
=∅
fˆ (S)gˆ(S)δ|S|.
Note that this deﬁnition slightly differs from the deﬁnition used in [10]. Finally, we note that for
all f ∈ X ,
fˆ (∅) = 〈 f , r∅〉 = Eμ[ f · 1] = Eμ[ f ].
2.2. The Bonamie–Beckner noise operator
The noise operator, introduced in [2,4], is deﬁned in terms of the Fourier–Walsh expansion as fol-
lows:
Deﬁnition 2.2. Consider a function f on the discrete cube with a Fourier–Walsh expansion f =∑
S fˆ (S)rS . For 0   1, the noise operator T applied to f is
T f =
∑
S
|S| fˆ (S)rS . (1)
It is well known that one can arrive from f to T f by the following process: For any x ∈ {0,1}n ,
T f (x) = E
[
f (x⊕ y)], (2)
where ⊕ denotes coordinate-wise addition modulo 2, and each coordinate of y is chosen indepen-
dently according to the distribution Pr[yi = 0] = (1 + )/2, Pr[yi = 1] = (1 − )/2. That is, each
coordinate of x is left unchanged with probability  and is replaced by a random value with proba-
bility 1−  , and then f is evaluated on the result. Thus, T f represents a noisy variant of f , and for
this reason T f is called “the noise operator”.
As pointed out by the anonymous referee, the noise operator can be deﬁned in the same way (i.e.,
by Eq. (1)) also for −1   0. Moreover, it can be easily shown that the basic property of the noise
operator described above (i.e., Eq. (2)) also translates to the case −1   0. That is, we still have
T f (x) = E
[
f (x⊕ y)],
where each coordinate of y is chosen independently according to the distribution Pr[yi = 0] =
(1 + )/2, Pr[yi = 1] = (1 − )/2. Using this observation, we shall consider the noise operator for
−1   1.
3. The probability of rational choice for a non-uniform distribution of the preferences
Throughout the paper we assume that the number of alternatives is three and denote the alterna-
tives by A, B , and C . Since (by assumption) the GSWF satisﬁes the IIA condition, the preference of the
society between every pair of alternatives can be represented by a Boolean function on the discrete
cube. Formally, given a proﬁle, we consider the pair of alternatives (A, B) and construct a binary vec-
tor (x1, . . . , xn) such that xi = 1 if the i-th voter prefers A over B , and xi = 0 if the i-th voter prefers
B over A. We set f (x1, . . . , xn) = 1 if the entire society prefers A over B and f (x1, . . . , xn) = 0 if the
society prefers B over A. Note that the preference of the society between A and B is determined
by (x1, . . . , xn), and hence f is well deﬁned. Similarly, we deﬁne the Boolean functions g and h that
represent the preferences between the pairs (B,C) and (C, A), respectively (see Fig. 1).
Every proﬁle is uniquely represented by the binary vector (x1, . . . , xn, y1, . . . , yn, z1, . . . , zn), where
(xi, yi, zi) represent the preferences of the i-th voter between (A, B), (B,C), and (C, A). We assume
that the vectors (xi, yi, zi) for different values of i are independent (i.e., the preferences of the indi-
vidual voters are independent), and that these vectors do not assume the values (0,0,0) and (1,1,1)
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distribution over the six possible values of (xi, yi, zi) was assumed to be uniform. In our analysis, we
consider the following distribution:
Pr
[
(xi, yi, zi) = (1,1,0)
]= α, Pr[(xi, yi, zi) = (0,1,1)]= β,
Pr
[
(xi, yi, zi) = (1,0,1)
]= γ , Pr[(xi, yi, zi) = (0,0,1)]= α,
Pr
[
(xi, yi, zi) = (1,0,0)
]= β, Pr[(xi, yi, zi) = (0,1,0)]= γ ,
where α + β + γ = 1/2. We call this distribution an even product distribution, and denote it by
D(α,β,γ ). The intuition behind the restrictions will be explained at the end of this section.
Theorem 3.1. Consider a GSWF on three alternatives satisfying the IIA condition where the choice functions
between the pairs of alternatives (A, B), (B,C), and (C, A) are f , g, and h, respectively. If the distribution of
the individual preferences is an even product distribution D(α,β,γ ), as described above, then the probability
of irrational choice is given by the formula:
W ( f , g,h) = p1p2p3 + (1− p1)(1− p2)(1− p3) + 〈〈 f , g〉〉4α−1 + 〈〈g,h〉〉4β−1
+ 〈〈h, f 〉〉4γ−1, (3)
where p1 , p2, and p3 are the expectations of f , g, and h, respectively.
Remark 3.2. Theorem 3.1 generalizes Theorem 3.1 of [10], which corresponds to the case α = β = γ =
1/6.
Proof. For a proﬁle (x, y, z) = (x1, . . . , xn, y1, . . . , yn, z1, . . . , zn), the choice of the society is rational if
and only if
f (x)g(y)h(z) + (1− f (x))(1− g(y))(1− h(z))= 0.
Therefore, the probability of irrational choice is
W ( f , g,h) =
∑
(x,y,z)∈{0,1}3n
Pr
[
(x, y, z)
](
f (x)g(y)h(z) + (1− f (x))(1− g(y))(1− h(z))),
where Pr[(x, y, z)] =∏i Pr[(xi, yi, zi)], according to the distribution D(α,β,γ ).
Consider the functions F1, F2, F3 : {0,1}3n → R deﬁned by
F1(x1, . . . , xn, y1, . . . , yn, z1, . . . , zn) = f (x)g(y)h(z),
F2(x1, . . . , xn, y1, . . . , yn, z1, . . . , zn) =
(
1− f (x))(1− g(y))(1− h(z)),
F3(x1, . . . , xn, y1, . . . , yn, z1, . . . , zn) = Pr
[
(x, y, z)
]
.
We have
W ( f , g,h) = 23n〈F3, F1 + F2〉,
and hence by the Parseval identity,
W ( f , g,h) = 23n
∑
S⊂{1,...,3n}
Fˆ3(S)
(
Fˆ1(S) + Fˆ2(S)
)
. (4)
Therefore, in order to compute the probability of rational choice it is suﬃcient to compute the
Fourier–Walsh expansions of F1, F2, and F3.
In order to compute the expansions, we use the fact that if a function is a multiplication of func-
tions on disjoint sets of variables, then its Fourier–Walsh expansion also has the same structure.
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S3 represents (z1, . . . , zn), then
Fˆ1(S) = fˆ (S1)gˆ(S2)hˆ(S3) and Fˆ2(S) = 1̂− f (S1)1̂− g(S2)1̂− h(S3).
Similarly, since the individual preferences are independent, the Fourier–Walsh expansion of F3 is de-
termined by the Fourier–Walsh expansion of the functions F i4 : {0,1}3 → R deﬁned by
F i4
(
(xi, yi, zi)
)= Pr[(xi, yi, zi)].
This expansion (presented below) can be found by direct computation:
Fˆ i4(∅) = 1/8, Fˆ i4
({1})= 0, Fˆ i4({2})= 0, Fˆ i4({3})= 0,
Fˆ i4
({1,2})= (4α − 1)/8, Fˆ i4({2,3})= (4β − 1)/8, Fˆ i4({1,3})= (4γ − 1)/8,
Fˆ i4
({1,2,3})= 0.
Since the Fourier–Walsh coeﬃcients of F3 are multiplications of the corresponding coeﬃcients of
{F i4}ni=1, we have Fˆ3(S) = 0, unless S = (S1, S2, S3) has a special structure: Each 1 i  n is contained
in either none or two of the sets (S1, S2, S3). For such special sets S , the coeﬃcients are given by the
formula
Fˆ3(S) =
(
1
8
)t1(4α − 1
8
)t2(4β − 1
8
)t3(4γ − 1
8
)t4
,
where
t1 = the number of triples (xi, yi, zi) equal to (0,0,0),
t2 = the number of triples (xi, yi, zi) equal to (1,1,0),
t3 = the number of triples (xi, yi, zi) equal to (0,1,1),
t4 = the number of triples (xi, yi, zi) equal to (1,0,1).
Finally, we note that by the linearity of the Fourier transform, we have fˆ (S1) = −(1̂− f (S1)) for
all S1 
= ∅, and the same for g and h. Therefore, if S1, S2, S3 
= ∅, then
Fˆ1(S) + Fˆ2(S) = 0.
Combining the observations above, we get that the term
Fˆ3(S)
(
Fˆ1(S) + Fˆ2(S)
)
vanishes unless S = (S1, S2, S3) has the following special structure: At least one of S1, S2, S3 is
empty, and each i is contained in either none or two of S1, S2, S3.
Assume that S3 = ∅, and thus S1 = S2 (otherwise, there exists i that is contained in only one of
the sets S1, S2, S3, and hence Fˆ3(S)( Fˆ1(S) + Fˆ2(S)) = 0). Assume also that S1 
= ∅. We note that
1̂− h(∅) = 1− hˆ(∅), and hence by the calculations above,
Fˆ3(S)
(
Fˆ1(S) + Fˆ2(S)
)= (1
8
)n−|S1|(4α − 1
8
)|S1|
fˆ (S1)gˆ(S1)
=
(
1
8
)n
(4α − 1)|S1| fˆ (S1)gˆ(S1).
If S1 = S2 = S3 = ∅, then
Fˆ3(S)
(
Fˆ1(S) + Fˆ2(S)
)= (1/8)n(p1p2p3 + (1− p1)(1− p2)(1− p3)).
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S⊂{1,...,3n}
Fˆ3(S)
(
Fˆ1(S) + Fˆ2(S)
)
= (1/8)n
(
p1p2p3 + (1− p1)(1− p2)(1− p3) +
∑
S1 
=∅
(4α − 1)|S1| fˆ (S1)gˆ(S1)
+
∑
S2 
=∅
(4β − 1)|S2| gˆ(S2)hˆ(S2) +
∑
S3 
=∅
(4γ − 1)|S3| fˆ (S3)hˆ(S3)
)
= (1/8)n(p1p2p3 + (1− p1)(1− p2)(1− p3) + 〈〈 f , g〉〉4α−1 + 〈〈g,h〉〉4β−1
+ 〈〈h, f 〉〉4γ−1
)
,
and thus the assertion of the theorem follows from Eq. (4). 
Using Theorem 3.1, some of the results of [10] and [15] can be generalized to even product distri-
butions of the preferences. We present here two of the results.
Theorem 3.3. Consider a GSWF on three alternatives satisfying the IIA condition. If the distribution of the pref-
erences is an even product distribution D(α,β,γ ) and the GSWF is neutral and symmetric, then the probability
of an irrational choice satisﬁes the inequality
W ( f , g,h)
(
1
4
− dm
)(
1+ (4α − 1)3 + (4β − 1)3 + (4γ − 1)3)> 0, (5)
where dm ≈ 1/(2π) is the sum of squares of the ﬁrst-level Fourier–Walsh coeﬃcients of the majority function.
In particular, W ( f , g,h) is bounded away from zero.
Remark 3.4. Theorem 3.3 generalizes Theorem 5.1 in [10], which corresponds to the case α = β =
γ = 1/6.
In the proof of Theorem 3.3 we use the following technical lemma, obtained with the assistance
of Tomer Schlank.
Lemma 3.5. For any integer k 1, and all −1 x, y, z 1 such that x+ y + z = 1, we have
x3 + y3 + z3  x2k+1 + y2k+1 + z2k+1. (6)
Proof. Denote D = {(x, y, z) ∈ [−1,1]3|x+ y+ z = 1}, and f (x, y, z) = (x3+ y3+ z3)− (x2k+1+ y2k+1+
z2k+1). Since D is compact and f is continuous, f obtains a minimum in D . We would like to show
that minD( f ) = 0. First, we note that f is identically zero on the boundary of D . Indeed, if (x, y, z) ∈
∂(D), then w.l.o.g., either x = −1 and then necessarily y = z = 1, or x = 1 and then y = −z. In both
cases, f (x, y, z) = 0. If f attains its minimum in an internal point (x0, y0, z0) ∈ D , then by Lagrange
multipliers, we have
3x20 − (2k + 1)x2k0 = 3y20 − (2k + 1)y2k0 = 3z20 − (2k + 1)z2k0 .
If |x0| 
= |y0|, the ﬁrst equality is equivalent to:
3
2k + 1 =
x2k0 − y2k0
x20 − y20
=
k−1∑
l=0
(
x20
)l(
y20
)k−1−l
, (7)
and similarly for the pairs (x0, z0) and (y0, z0). For a given x0, the function
∑k−1
l=0 (x20)l(y20)k−1−l is
increasing as function of y20. Hence, Eq. (7) can be satisﬁed for both (x0, y0) and (x0, z0) only if
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|x0| = |y0|, |x0| = |z0| or |y0| = |z0|. Assume, w.l.o.g., that |x0| = |y0|. If x0 = −y0, then necessarily
z0 = 1, and thus (x0, y0, z0) ∈ ∂(D). If x0 = y0, then z0 = 1− 2x0, and hence, inequality (6) is reduced
to:
2x30 + (1− 2x0)3  2x2k+10 + (1− 2x0)2k+1. (8)
Therefore, it is suﬃcient to prove inequality (8) for all 0  x0  1. Note that the inequality holds
trivially for x0  1/2. Let g(t) = t3 − t2k+1, and denote δ = 1 − x. By inequality (8), it is suﬃcient to
prove that for all 0 δ  1/2,
2g(1− δ) g(1− 2δ). (9)
We use the following two properties of g(t):
1. g(t) is non-negative for all 0  t  1. Furthermore, g is monotone increasing for 0 < t < t0 and
monotone decreasing for t0 < t < 1, where t0 = ( 32k+1 )1/(2k−2) .
2. g(t) is convex in the domain 0 < t < t1, and concave in the domain t1 < t < 1, where t1 =
( 62k(2k+1) )
1/(2k−2) .
Since g(1) = 0, inequality (9) follows from the concavity of g whenever 1 − 2δ  t1. Furthermore,
when 1 − δ  t0, the inequality follows immediately from the monotonicity and non-negativity of
g in that domain. The only remaining case is when 1 − 2δ < t1 and 1 − δ > t0 (or equivalently,
(1− t1)/2 < δ < 1− t0. We note that this domain may be empty, and in this case we are already done
by the previous considerations). In this case, by the monotonicity properties of g we have g(1− δ) >
g((1+ t1)/2) (since t0 < 1− δ < (1+ t1)/2), and g(1− 2δ) < g(t1) (since 1− 2δ < t1 < t0). Therefore,
2g(1− δ) − g(1− 2δ) > 2g((1+ t1)/2)− g(t1) 0,
where the last inequality follows from the concavity of g(t) for t1 < t < 1. This completes the
proof. 
Proof of Theorem 3.3. By assumption, the GSWF is neutral, and hence, balanced. Therefore, by Theo-
rem 3.1, the probability of irrational choice in our case is
W ( f , g,h) = 1/4+ 〈〈 f , g〉〉4α−1 + 〈〈g,h〉〉4β−1 + 〈〈h, f 〉〉4γ−1.
Since the GSWF is neutral and symmetric, we have f = g = h, and all the Fourier–Walsh coeﬃcients
of f on the even non-zero levels vanish (see [10], Proof of Theorem 5.1). Thus,
W ( f , g,h) = 1/4+
∑
|S| odd
fˆ (S)2(4α − 1)|S| +
∑
|S| odd
fˆ (S)2(4β − 1)|S|
+
∑
|S| odd
fˆ (S)2(4γ − 1)|S|
= 1/4+
n/2−1∑
k=0
[(
(4α − 1)2k+1 + (4β − 1)2k+1 + (4γ − 1)2k+1) ∑
|S|=2k+1
fˆ (S)2
]
= 1/4−
∑
|S|=1
fˆ (S)2
+
n/2−1∑
k=1
(
(4α − 1)2k+1 + (4β − 1)2k+1 + (4γ − 1)2k+1) ∑
|S|=2k+1
fˆ (S)2,
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|S|=2k+1 fˆ (S)2 is non-negative, and since by Lemma 3.5, for all k 1,
(4α − 1)2k+1 + (4β − 1)2k+1 + (4γ − 1)2k+1  (4α − 1)3 + (4β − 1)3 + (4γ − 1)3,
it follows that
W ( f , g,h) 1/4−
∑
|S|=1
fˆ (S)2 + ((4α − 1)3 + (4β − 1)3 + (4γ − 1)3) ∑
|S|>1
fˆ (S)2
=
(
1/4−
∑
|S|=1
fˆ (S)2
)(
1+ (4α − 1)3 + (4β − 1)3 + (4γ − 1)3),
where the last equality follows from the Parseval identity. Since amongst the symmetric neutral func-
tions, the expression
∑
|S|=1 fˆ (S)2 is maximized for the majority function (see proof of Theorem 5.1
in [10]), we get
W ( f , g,h)
(
1
4
− dm
)(
1+ (4α − 1)3 + (4β − 1)3 + (4γ − 1)3),
and thus it is only left to show that
(4α − 1)3 + (4β − 1)3 + (4γ − 1)3 > −1. (10)
This claim is trivial for α,β,γ  1/4, since in that case
(4α − 1)3 + (4β − 1)3 + (4γ − 1)3 > (4α − 1) + (4β − 1) + (4γ − 1) = −1.
Hence, assume that γ > 1/4, and write γ = 1/2 − α − β (and thus 4γ − 1 = 1 − 4α − 4β). Inequal-
ity (10) is equivalent to
(1− 4α)3 + (1− 4β)3 < 1+ (1− 4α − 4β)3,
that follows from the strict convexity of the function F (t) = t3 on [0,1]. This completes the proof of
Theorem 3.3. 
The second result is a combination of Theorem 3.1 with the following proposition, which is an
easy consequence of the “Majority is stablest” theorem [15]:
Proposition 3.6. Let 0  ρ  1 and let  > 0. There exists n0 = n0(ρ, ) such that for all n > n0 , if
f : {0,1}n → [0,1] is symmetric and balanced then
〈〈 f , f 〉〉ρ =
∑
S 
=∅
fˆ (S)2ρ|S|  1
2π
arcsinρ + .
Corollary 3.7. Consider a GSWF on three alternatives, where the distribution of the preferences is an even
product distribution D(α,β,γ ) with α,β,γ  1/4. Then for all  > 0 there exists n0 = n0(,α,β,γ ) such
that if the number of voters is n > n0 and the GSWF is neutral, symmetric, and satisﬁes the IIA condition, then
the probability of a rational choice is at most p +  , where p is the probability of a rational choice for the
majority GSWF on n voters and three alternatives.
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W ( f , g,h) = 1/4+
∑
|S| odd
fˆ (S)2(4α − 1)|S| +
∑
|S| odd
fˆ (S)2(4β − 1)|S|
+
∑
|S| odd
fˆ (S)2(4γ − 1)|S|
= 1/4−
∑
|S| odd
fˆ (S)2|4α − 1||S| −
∑
|S| odd
fˆ (S)2|4β − 1||S|
−
∑
|S| odd
fˆ (S)2|4γ − 1||S|
= 1/4− 〈〈 f , f 〉〉|4α−1| − 〈〈 f , f 〉〉|4β−1| − 〈〈 f , f 〉〉|4γ−1|.
Hence, by Proposition 3.6, for every  > 0 there exists n0 = n0(,α,β,γ ) such that for every GSWF
on n > n0 voters satisfying the assumptions of the corollary,
W ( f , g,h) 1/4− 1
2π
arcsin
(|4α − 1|)− 1
2π
arcsin
(|4β − 1|)− 1
2π
arcsin
(|4γ − 1|)− .
Finally, since for the majority GSWF Fn on n voters we have, for all 0 ρ  1,
lim
n→∞〈〈Fn, Fn〉〉ρ =
1
2π
arcsinρ
(see [15], Section 4), the assertion of the corollary follows. 
Remark 3.8. Corollary 3.7 is proved in [15] for a uniform distribution of the preferences, as a corollary
of the “Majority is Stablest” theorem.
Remark 3.9. Conjecture 8.1 of [10] asserts that for every distribution of the preferences (and even
for more than three alternatives), the probability of a rational choice for GSWFs that are neutral,
symmetric, and satisfy the IIA condition, is maximized for the majority function. Hence, Corollary 3.7
proves in the asymptotic sense (i.e., for a suﬃciently large n) a special case of the conjecture.
We conclude this section by explaining the restriction on the distribution of the individual prefer-
ences. The proof of Theorem 3.1 crucially depends on the fact that Fˆ i4({ j}) vanishes for j = 1,2,3. This
condition holds if and only if the probabilities of the preferences satisfy the following three equations:
Pr[1,0,0] + Pr[1,1,0] + Pr[1,0,1] − Pr[0,1,0] − Pr[0,0,1] − Pr[0,1,1] = 0,
Pr[0,1,0] + Pr[1,1,0] + Pr[0,1,1] − Pr[1,0,0] − Pr[0,0,1] − Pr[1,0,1] = 0,
Pr[0,0,1] + Pr[1,0,1] + Pr[0,1,1] − Pr[1,0,0] − Pr[0,1,0] − Pr[1,1,0] = 0,
where Pr[a,b, c] is a shorthand for Pr[(xi, yi, zi) = (a,b, c)]. Summing the ﬁrst two equations we get
2Pr[1,1,0] − 2Pr[0,0,1] = 0,
and similarly by summing the two other pairs of equations we get Pr[1,0,1] = Pr[0,1,0] and
Pr[0,1,1] = Pr[1,0,0]. Finally, since all the probabilities sum up to one, we get Pr[1,0,0] +
Pr[0,1,0] + Pr[0,0,1] = 1/2, and this completes the restrictions described above. It is challeng-
ing to generalize Theorem 3.1 to more general distributions on the preferences, but the expression∑
S⊂{1,...,3n} Fˆ3(S)( Fˆ1(S) + Fˆ2(S)) seems hard to compute in the general case.
4. Lower bounds on the probability of rational choice
In this section we establish lower bounds on the probability of a rational choice for two classes of
GSWFs: monotone balanced functions and general balanced functions.
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Deﬁnition 4.1. A function f : {0,1}n → R is monotone increasing if for all x = (x1, . . . , xn) and y =
(y1, . . . , yn),
(∀i: xi  yi) ⇒
(
f (x) f (y)
)
.
Similarly, a function is monotone decreasing if
(∀i: xi  yi) ⇒
(
f (x) f (y)
)
.
Theorem 1.2 is a special case of the following, more general, result:
Theorem 4.2. Consider a GSWF on three alternatives satisfying the IIA condition where the choice functions
between the pairs of alternatives (A, B), (B,C), and (C, A), denoted by f , g, and h, respectively, are monotone
increasing. If the distribution of the preferences is an even product distribution satisfying α,β,γ  1/4 (and
in particular, if the preferences are uniformly distributed) then the probability of irrational choice satisﬁes:
W ( f , g,h) p1p2p3 + (1− p1)(1− p2)(1− p3), (11)
where p1, p2, and p3 are the expectations of f , g, and h, respectively.
Remark 4.3. The assertion of Theorem 4.2 is tight, as can be seen in the following example: Assume
that f depends only on the ﬁrst voter, g depends only on the second voter, and h depends only on
the third voter. Then clearly, for all −1 δ  1,
〈〈 f , g〉〉δ = 〈〈g,h〉〉δ = 〈〈h, f 〉〉δ = 0,
and thus,
W ( f , g,h) = p1p2p3 + (1− p1)(1− p2)(1− p3),
where p1, p2, and p3 are the expectations of f , g, and h, respectively.
By Theorem 3.1, the assertion of Theorem 4.2 is an immediate consequence of the following propo-
sition:
Proposition 4.4. For any two monotone increasing Boolean functions f and g, and for every −1 δ  1,
1
δ
〈〈 f , g〉〉δ  0. (12)
The proof of Proposition 4.4 uses properties of the Bonamie–Beckner noise operator and the FKG
correlation inequality [7]. For the reader’s convenience, we recall the statement of the FKG inequality
in the special case of the uniform measure on the discrete cube.
Theorem 4.5 (Fortuin, Kasteleyn, and Ginibre). Consider the discrete cube {0,1}n endowed with the uniform
measure μ, and let f , g : {0,1}n → R. Then:
1. If both f and g are monotone increasing, then Eμ[ f g] Eμ[ f ]Eμ[g].
2. If f is monotone increasing and g is monotone decreasing, then Eμ[ f g] Eμ[ f ]Eμ[g].
Proof of Proposition 4.4. By the deﬁnition of the noise operator T , we have
1
δ
〈〈 f , g〉〉δ = 1
δ
∑
S 
=∅
δ|S| fˆ (S)gˆ(S) = 1
δ
∑
S 
=∅
T̂δ f (S)gˆ(S).
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1
δ
∑
S 
=∅
T̂δ f (S)gˆ(S) = 1
δ
(∑
S
T̂δ f (S)gˆ(S) − T̂δ f (∅)gˆ(∅)
)
= 1
δ
(
Eμ[Tδ f · g] − Eμ[Tδ f ]Eμ[g]
)
.
Hence, inequality (12) is equivalent to the inequality:
1
δ
(
Eμ[Tδ f · g] − Eμ[Tδ f ]Eμ[g]
)
 0. (13)
Since the function g is monotone increasing, inequality (13) will follow from the FKG inequality, once
we show that Tδ f is monotone increasing if 0 δ  1, and monotone decreasing if −1 δ  0. We
show the case of −1 δ  0 (the case of positive δ is similar).
Without loss of generality, it is suﬃcient to prove that for all (x2, . . . , xn) ∈ {0,1}n−1,
Tδ f (0, x2, . . . , xn) Tδ f (1, x2, . . . , xn). (14)
Using the equivalent deﬁnition of the noise operator presented in Section 2.2 (i.e., Eq. (2)),
Tδ f (x1, x2, . . . , xn) = E
[
f
(
(x1, x2, . . . , xn) ⊕ (y1, . . . , yn)
)]
,
where each yi is distributed according to the distribution Pr[yi = 0] = (1 + δ)/2, Pr[yi = 1] =
(1− δ)/2, independently of other yi ’s. Thus, we have to show that for all (x2, . . . , xn) ∈ {0,1}n−1,
E
[
f
(
(y1, x2 ⊕ y2, . . . , xn ⊕ yn)
)]
 E
[
f
(
(1⊕ y1, x2 ⊕ y2, . . . , xn ⊕ yn)
)]
.
Therefore, it is suﬃcient to show that for each (z2, . . . , zn) ∈ {0,1}n−1,
Ey1
[
f
(
(y1, z2, . . . , zn)
)]
 Ey1
[
f
(
(1⊕ y1, z2, . . . , zn)
)]
,
or equivalently
1+ δ
2
f (0, z2, . . . , zn) + 1− δ
2
f (1, z2, . . . , zn)
1− δ
2
f (0, z2, . . . , zn)
+ 1+ δ
2
f (1, z2, . . . , zn).
This inequality indeed follows from the monotonicity of f , since δ  0. This completes the proof of
Proposition 4.4. 
For a general even product distribution of the preferences, the probability of a rational choice for
balanced monotone choice functions can be as low as 1/2 (compared to 3/4 in the case α,β,γ 
1/4). An example in which the probability is 1/2 is the following:
Example. Assume that the distribution on the preferences is: Pr[(xi, yi, zi) = (1,1,0)] = 1/2 and
Pr[(xi, yi, zi) = (0,0,1)] = 1/2, while the probability of the other preferences is zero (i.e., α = 1/2
and β = γ = 0). The choice functions f and g are a dictatorship of the ﬁrst voter, and h is a dictator-
ship of the second voter. Then it is easy to see that W ( f , g,h) = 1/2.
It can be shown that 1/2 is a lower bound for the probability of a rational choice in our case.
Indeed, by Theorem 3.1, for balanced choice functions we have
W ( f , g,h) = 1/4+ 〈〈 f , g〉〉4α−1 + 〈〈g,h〉〉4β−1 + 〈〈h, f 〉〉4γ−1. (15)
By Proposition 4.4, an expression of the form 〈〈 f , g〉〉4α−1 can be positive only if α > 1/4. Since in
our distribution α + β + γ = 1/2, at most one of the expressions of this form appearing in Eq. (15) is
positive. By the Cauchy–Schwarz inequality,
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∑
S 
=∅
fˆ (S)gˆ(S)(4α − 1)|S|  1/4,
and similarly for β and γ . Therefore, W ( f , g,h) 1/4+ (1/4+ 0+ 0) = 1/2.
The probability of a rational choice is equal to 1/2 if and only if 〈〈 f , g〉〉4α−1 = 1/4, and
〈〈g,h〉〉4β−1 = 〈〈h, f 〉〉4γ−1 = 0 (up to a permutation between α,β, and γ ). By the Cauchy–Schwarz
inequality, this occurs if and only if the following three conditions are satisﬁed:
• The distribution of the preferences is α = 1/2, β = γ = 0.
• The choice functions f , g satisfy f = g .
• The choice function h is independent of f , in the following sense: The set of voters {1, . . . ,n}
can be partitioned into two disjoint sets A and B such that the output of f depends only on the
elements of A, and the output of h depends only on the elements of B .
4.2. General balanced GSWFs
In [10] it is stated (Proposition 5.2) that if the preferences are uniformly distributed, then the
lower bound for the probability of rational choice for general balanced GSWFs is 2/3. However, the
proof sketched in [10] is insuﬃcient,5 and it is not even clear that the lower bound itself is correct.
In this subsection we prove a weaker lower bound, and discuss its tightness.
Theorem 4.6. Consider a GSWF on three alternatives satisfying the IIA condition such that the choice functions
between the pairs of alternatives are balanced. If the preferences are uniformly distributed then the probability
of a rational choice is at least 5/8.
Proof. Consider the Fourier–Walsh expansions of the choice functions f , g , and h. Let
n∑
i=1
fˆ
({i})2 = a, n∑
i=1
gˆ
({i})2 = b, n∑
i=1
hˆ
({i})2 = c.
Since f , g, and h are balanced, then by the Parseval identity∑
|S|>1
fˆ (S)2 = 1/4− a,
∑
|S|>1
gˆ(S)2 = 1/4− b,
∑
|S|>1
hˆ(S)2 = 1/4− c.
Recall that by Theorem 3.1, in our case
W ( f , g,h) = 1/4+ 〈〈 f , g〉〉−1/3 + 〈〈g,h〉〉−1/3 + 〈〈h, f 〉〉−1/3. (16)
We have
〈〈 f , g〉〉−1/3 + 〈〈g,h〉〉−1/3 + 〈〈h, f 〉〉−1/3
=
∑
|S|>0
(
fˆ (S)gˆ(S) + gˆ(S)hˆ(S) + hˆ(S) fˆ (S))(−1/3)|S|
= −1
3
∑
|S|=1
(
fˆ (S)gˆ(S) + gˆ(S)hˆ(S) + hˆ(S) fˆ (S))
+
∑
|S|>1
(
fˆ (S)gˆ(S) + gˆ(S)hˆ(S) + hˆ(S) fˆ (S))(−1/3)|S|
5 The proof in [10] assumes implicitly that the least possible probability is achieved when the Fourier–Walsh coeﬃcients of
the functions f , g,h are concentrated on the second level. It is not clear whether this assumption is correct.
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3
∑
|S|=1
(
fˆ (S)gˆ(S) + gˆ(S)hˆ(S) + hˆ(S) fˆ (S))
+ 1
9
∑
|S|>1
∣∣ fˆ (S)gˆ(S) + gˆ(S)hˆ(S) + hˆ(S) fˆ (S)∣∣.
In order to bound the ﬁrst summand, we use the elementary inequality
−(xy + yz + xz) (x2 + y2 + z2)/2.
We get
−1
3
∑
|S|=1
(
fˆ (S)gˆ(S) + gˆ(S)hˆ(S) + hˆ(S) fˆ (S))
= −1
3
n∑
i=1
(
fˆ
({i})gˆ({i})+ gˆ({i})hˆ({i})+ hˆ({i}) fˆ ({i}))
 1
6
n∑
i=1
(
fˆ
({i})2 + gˆ({i})2 + hˆ({i})2)
= a+ b + c
6
.
In order to bound the second summand, we use the Cauchy–Schwarz inequality and the inequality
between the arithmetic and the geometric means. Let
f˜ =
∑
|S|>1
∣∣ fˆ (S)∣∣rS , g˜ = ∑
|S|>1
∣∣gˆ(S)∣∣rS .
Applying the Cauchy–Schwarz inequality and the Parseval identity we get∑
|S|>1
∣∣ fˆ (S)gˆ(S)∣∣= 〈 f˜ , g˜〉 ‖ f˜ ‖2‖g˜‖2 =√(1/4− a)(1/4− b) 1/4− (a+ b)/2,
where the last inequality follows from the inequality between the arithmetic and the geometric
means. Applying the same inequalities to the pairs (g,h) and (h, f ), we get
1
9
∑
|S|>1
∣∣ fˆ (S)gˆ(S) + gˆ(S)hˆ(S) + hˆ(S) fˆ (S)∣∣ 1
9
(
1
4
− a+ b
2
+ 1
4
− b + c
2
+ 1
4
− c + a
2
)
= 1
12
− a+ b + c
9
.
Combining the bounds obtained above, we get
−1
3
∑
|S|=1
(
fˆ (S)gˆ(S) + gˆ(S)hˆ(S) + hˆ(S) fˆ (S))+ 1
9
∑
|S|>1
∣∣ fˆ (S)gˆ(S) + gˆ(S)hˆ(S) + hˆ(S) fˆ (S)∣∣
 a+ b + c
6
+ 1
12
− a+ b + c
9
= 1
12
+ a+ b + c
18
.
Substitution to Eq. (16) yields:
W ( f , g,h) 1/4+ 1/12+ (a+ b + c)/18= 1/3+ (a+ b + c)/18.
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is obtained for a = b = c = 1/4, and thus,
W ( f , g,h) 1/3+ (3/4)/18= 3/8,
as asserted. 
The tightness of the lower bound in Theorem 4.6 is not clear to us. The example presented in [10]
yields the value W ( f , g,h) = 1/3, where all the Fourier–Walsh coeﬃcients of f , g , and h are concen-
trated on the second level. Another example yielding the same value of W ( f , g,h) is
f (x1, . . . , xn) = xi, g(x1, . . . , xn) = xi, h(x1, . . . , xn) = 1− xi,
for any 1 i  n. In this example, all the weight of f , g, and h is concentrated on the ﬁrst level. It
seems possible that the correct lower bound is 2/3, as asserted in [10]. However, in order to prove
this bound, one has to exploit the fact that the choice functions are Boolean, as can be seen in the
following example:
Example. Let f , g,h be deﬁned by fˆ (∅) = gˆ(∅) = hˆ(∅) = 1/2 and
fˆ (i) = 2
2
√
6
, fˆ ( j) = − 1
2
√
6
, fˆ (k) = − 1
2
√
6
,
gˆ(i) = − 1
2
√
6
, gˆ( j) = 2
2
√
6
, gˆ(k) = − 1
2
√
6
,
hˆ(i) = − 1
2
√
6
, hˆ( j) = − 1
2
√
6
, hˆ(k) = 2
2
√
6
,
for 1 i < j < k n. The rest of the Fourier–Walsh coeﬃcients of f , g, and h are zero. Since∑
S 
=∅
fˆ (S)2 =
∑
S 
=∅
gˆ(S)2 =
∑
S 
=∅
hˆ(S)2 = 1/4,
the functions f , g, and h “look like” balanced functions from the Fourier-theoretic point of view.
Nevertheless, W ( f , g,h) = 3/8, which agrees with the lower bound of Theorem 4.6. This shows that
in order to improve Theorem 4.6, we have to use the fact that f , g, and h are Boolean functions.
5. Upper bounds on the probability of rational choice
Throughout this section we assume that the preferences are uniformly distributed.
In this section we discuss Kalai’s [10] proof of Arrow’s Impossibility theorem for neutral GSWFs
on three alternatives. First we discuss the possibility of extending Kalai’s proof to other special cases
of Arrow’s theorem, and then we discuss the stability version of the theorem proved by Kalai (for
neutral GSWFs).
5.1. Extending Kalai’s proof to other special cases of Arrow’s theorem
Kalai’s proof uses the Fourier-theoretic formula for the probability of irrational choice for GSWFs
on three alternatives satisfying the IIA condition (Theorem 3.1). For a balanced GSWF, the formula
reads:
W ( f , g,h) = 1/4+ 〈〈 f , g〉〉−1/3 + 〈〈g,h〉〉−1/3 + 〈〈h, f 〉〉−1/3. (17)
Deﬁne
f˜ =
∑
S 
=∅
fˆ (S)rS , g¯ =
∑
S 
=∅
gˆ(S)(−1/3)|S|rS .
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by the Cauchy–Schwarz inequality,∣∣〈〈 f , g〉〉−1/3∣∣= ∣∣〈 f˜ , g¯〉∣∣ ‖ f˜ ‖2‖g¯‖2  1/12,
and it can be shown that equality can hold only if all the Fourier–Walsh coeﬃcients of f and of g
are on the ﬁrst level. Then, it can be further shown that W ( f , g,h) = 0 can hold only if f , g, and h
are dictatorships of the same voter, and this completes the proof of the theorem.
It was suggested in [10] to use the same reasoning in the non-balanced case. Such generalization
is possible if p1, p2, and p3, the expectations of f , g, and h, satisfy some condition described in [10].
However, this condition is not satisﬁed in many cases, e.g., for p1 = p2 = 1/5 and p3 = 1, as noted
in [10]. Kalai [11] suggested to improve the upper bound ‖g¯‖2  1/6 (or, more generally, ‖g¯‖2 √
p2(1− p2)/3) used in the proof by using the Bonamie–Beckner hypercontractive inequality [2,4].
We show by an example that this proof strategy, even using the hypercontractive inequality, cannot
lead to a complete proof of Arrow’s theorem. The example shows that if the biased inner product
〈〈 f , g〉〉−1/3 is replaced by
〈〈 f , g〉〉′−1/3 = −
∑
S 
=∅
∣∣ fˆ (S)gˆ(S)(−1/3)|S|∣∣,
then there exist functions f , g,h such that
W ′( f , g,h) = p1p2p3 + (1− p1)(1− p2)(1− p3) + 〈〈 f , g〉〉′−1/3 + 〈〈g,h〉〉′−1/3
+ 〈〈h, f 〉〉′−1/3
< 0.
Hence, a proof of Arrow’s theorem using Eq. (17) cannot ignore the sign of the Fourier–Walsh coeﬃ-
cients of the choice functions.
The example uses the notion of a dual function:
Deﬁnition 5.1. Let f : {0,1}n → {0,1}. The dual function of f (which we denote by f ′ : {0,1}n →
{0,1}), is deﬁned by
f ′(x1, x2, . . . , xn) = 1− f (1− x1,1− x2, . . . ,1− xn).
The Fourier–Walsh expansion of the dual function is closely related to the expansion of the original
function:
Claim 5.2. Consider the Fourier–Walsh expansions of a Boolean function f and its dual function f ′ . For all
S ⊂ {1, . . . ,n} with |S| 1,
fˆ ′(S) = (−1)|S|−1 fˆ (S).
The simple proof of the claim is omitted.
Example. Assume that n is odd, f (x1, x2, . . . , xn) = x1 · x2 · . . . · xn is the AND function, g = f ′ is its
dual function, and h is the majority function. We have
p1 = E[ f ] = 2−n, p2 = E[g] = 1− 2−n, p3 = E[h] = 1/2.
The Fourier–Walsh coeﬃcients of f satisfy | fˆ (S)| = 2−n for all S ⊂ {1, . . . ,n}. The ﬁrst-level Fourier–
Walsh coeﬃcients of the majority function are
hˆ
({i})= ( n − 1
(n− 1)/2
)
2−n ≈
√
1
2πn
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〈〈h, f 〉〉′−1/3 −
1
3
n∑
i=1
∣∣hˆ({i}) fˆ ({i})∣∣≈ −1
3
n2−n
√
1
2πn
= − 1
3
√
2π
√
n2−n.
Therefore,
W ′( f , g,h) p1p2p3 + (1− p1)(1− p2)(1− p3) + 〈〈h, f 〉〉′−1/3
 2−n
(
1− 2−n)− 1
3
√
2
√
n2−n < 0,
for n large enough.
A possible step towards a Fourier-theoretic proof of Arrow’s theorem in the general case is the
following lower bound on the biased inner product 〈〈 f , g〉〉δ :
Proposition 5.3. Let f , g : {0,1}n → R+ be non-negative functions with E[ f ] = p1 and E[g] = p2 , and let
−1 δ  1. Then
〈〈 f , g〉〉δ −p1p2,
and equality holds if and only if either f ≡ 0 or g ≡ 0.
Proof. We prove the proposition in the case δ < 0, the case δ  0 is similar. Let f ′′(x1, . . . , xn) =
f (1− x1, . . . ,1− xn). Clearly, fˆ ′′(∅) = E[ f ′′] = p1. By Claim 5.2, for all S 
= ∅,
fˆ ′′(S) = (−1)|S| fˆ (S).
Hence, by the deﬁnition of the Bonamie–Beckner noise operator,
T̂−δ f ′′(S) = (−δ)|S|(−1)|S| fˆ (S) = δ|S| fˆ (S).
Therefore, by the Parseval identity,
〈〈 f , g〉〉δ + p1p2 =
∑
S 
=∅
fˆ (S)gˆ(S)δ|S| + p1p2
=
∑
S 
=∅
T̂−δ f ′′(S)gˆ(S) + T̂−δ f ′′(∅)gˆ(∅)
= 〈T−δ f ′′, g〉.
Finally, by the assumption g is non-negative, and by Eq. (2), the function T−δ f ′′ is strictly positive,
unless f ≡ 0. Hence,
〈
T−δ f ′′, g
〉= 1
2n
∑
x∈{0,1}n
T−δ f ′′(x)g(x) > 0,
unless either f ≡ 0 or g ≡ 0, and in that cases 〈T−δ f ′′, g〉 = 0. This completes the proof of the propo-
sition. 
Corollary 5.4. The assertion of Arrow’s theorem holds if p1 + p2 + p3  1, where p1, p2, and p3 are the
expectations of the choice functions f , g, and h.
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〈〈 f , g〉〉−1/3 + 〈〈g,h〉〉−1/3 + 〈〈h, f 〉〉−1/3 > −(p1p2 + p2p3 + p3p1).
(Equality cannot hold since by the assumption of Arrow’s theorem, f , g, and h are non-constant.)
Hence, by Eq. (3),
W ( f , g,h) > p1p2p3 + (1− p1)(1− p2)(1− p3) − (p1p2 + p2p3 + p3p1)
= 1− p1 − p2 − p3  0,
and thus the assertion of Arrow’s theorem holds. 
Another corollary of Proposition 5.3 uses dual functions:
Corollary 5.5. Let f , g : {0,1}n → {0,1} such that E[ f ] = p1 and E[g] = p2 , and let −1 δ  1. Then
〈〈 f , g〉〉δ −(1− p1)(1− p2),
and equality holds if and only if either f ≡ 1 or g ≡ 1.
Proof. Denote the dual functions of f and g by f ′ and g′ , respectively. By Claim 5.2, for all S 
= ∅,
fˆ ′(S)gˆ′(S) = (−1)|S|−1 fˆ (S)(−1)|S|−1 gˆ(S) = fˆ (S)gˆ(S),
and hence〈〈
f ′, g′
〉〉
δ
= 〈〈 f , g〉〉δ.
The functions f ′, g′ are non-negative and satisfy E[ f ′] = 1− p1 and E[g′] = 1− p2. Thus, by Propo-
sition 5.3,〈〈
f ′, g′
〉〉
δ
−(1− p1)(1− p2),
and equality holds if and only if f ′ ≡ 0 or g′ ≡ 0, or equivalently, if and only if f ≡ 1 or g ≡ 1. 
Proposition 5.3 and Corollary 5.5 yield an immediate proof of Arrow’s theorem in the case where
there exists 1 i  3 such that pi = 0 or pi = 1. Indeed, two of the biased inner products of the form
〈〈 f , g〉〉δ appearing in Eq. (3) vanish, and the third biased inner product can be bounded using either
Proposition 5.3 or Corollary 5.5. This settles the example given in [10]. However, we note that this
case is anyway ruled out by the assumption (made in Arrow’s theorem) that the choice functions are
non-constant.
It seems possible that Kalai’s proof and Proposition 5.3 can be extended to a proof of broader
special cases of Arrow’s theorem. Such extension is of interest even after the recent analytic proof of
Arrow’s theorem (in the general case) by Mossel [16], since in the cases where Kalai’s proof applies,
the same argument yields a stability version of the theorem in which the dependence of δ() on  is
linear, while the dependence in Mossel’s theorem is much weaker.
5.2. Discussion on a stability version of Arrow’s theorem
In [10], Kalai proved a stability version of Arrow’s theorem:
Theorem 5.6. (See [10].) For every  > 0 and for every balanced GSWF on three alternatives, if the probability
that the social choice is irrational is smaller than  then there is a dictator such that the probability that the
output of the GSWF differs from the dictator’s choice is smaller than K ·  , where K is a universal constant.
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Question 5.7. Amongst the GSWFs on three alternatives satisfying the assumptions of Arrow’s the-
orem, which is the “most rational” one (i.e., the one having the highest probability of a rational
outcome)?
Remark 5.8. The idea behind the question is similar to the idea behind the Hilton–Milner theorem [9]
concerning intersecting families. A family of subsets of a given ﬁnite set is called intersecting if the
intersection of any two elements of the family is non-empty. The Erdös–Ko–Rado theorem [6] asserts
that an intersecting family of k-element subsets of an n-element set has at most
(n−1
k−1
)
elements, and
that the only maximal families are of the form {S ⊂ {1, . . . ,n}: |S| = k, i ∈ S}, for 1  i  n. The
Hilton–Milner theorem [9] answers the question: What is the second largest intersecting family?
Similarly, in our situation, Arrow’s theorem asserts that under some conditions, the only “most
rational” GSWFs are the dictatorship functions. Question 5.7 asks, what is the most rational GSWF
except for the dictatorship functions.
One class of natural candidates for being the most rational GSWF is functions close to a dictator-
ship. Since the probability that the output of the GSWF differs from a dictatorship is at least 2−n ,
Theorem 5.6 implies that for every balanced function of this class, the probability of irrational choice
is at least K−1 · 2−n , where K is a universal constant.
Another class of natural candidates is almost constant functions. It can be shown that if all the
three choice functions are almost constant (e.g., f (x1, . . . , xn) = 1 unless (x1, . . . , xn) = (0,0, . . . ,0))
then the probability of irrational choice is also Θ(2−n).
However, it appears that there exists a GSWF with a much lower probability of irrational outcome:
Example. Assume that n is odd, f (x1, x2, . . . , xn) = x1 · x2 · . . . · xn is the AND function, g = f ′ is its
dual function, and h is the majority function. Let
p1 = E[ f ] = 2−n, p2 = E[g] = 1− 2−n, p3 = E[h] = 1/2.
By the proof of Proposition 5.3,
〈〈 f , g〉〉−1/3 =
〈
T1/3 f
′′, g
〉− p1p2.
By Eq. (2),
〈
T1/3 f
′′, g
〉= 2−n ∑
x∈{0,1}n
(
1
3
)∑n
i=1 xi(2
3
)n−∑ni=1 xi
g(x) = 2−n
(
1−
(
2
3
)n)
,
and thus,
〈〈 f , g〉〉−1/3 = 2−n
(
1− (2/3)n)− 2−n(1− 2−n)= −(1/3)n + (1/4)n.
Similarly,
〈
T1/3 f
′′,h
〉= 2−n ∑
x∈{0,1}n
(
1
3
)∑n
i=1 xi(2
3
)n−∑ni=1 xi
h(x)
= 2−n
∑
{x: ∑ni=1 xi>n/2}
(
1
3
)∑n
i=1 xi(2
3
)n−∑ni=1 xi
 2−n
∑
{x: ∑n x >n/2}
(
1
3
)n/2(2
3
)n/2
= 1
2
(
2
9
)n/2
≈ 1
2
· 0.471n.i=1 i
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〈〈 f ,h〉〉−1/3  1
2
· 0.471n − 1
2
· 2−n.
Finally, since the dual function of f is g and since h is self-dual,
〈〈g,h〉〉−1/3 = 〈〈 f ,h〉〉−1/3.
Therefore,
W ( f , g,h) = p1p2p3 + (1− p1)(1− p2)(1− p3) + 〈〈 f , g〉〉−1/3 + 〈〈g,h〉〉−1/3
+ 〈〈h, f 〉〉−1/3
 2−n
(
1− 2−n)+ 0.471n − 2−n − (1/3)n + (1/4)n
 0.471n.
We conjecture that the GSWF in the example is the most rational GSWF under the conditions of
Arrow’s theorem, but we weren’t able to prove this conjecture.
The example can be generalized to a series of examples that proves Theorem 1.3.
Example. For 0 < q < 1/2, for any K > 0, and for an odd n, let
f (x) =
{
1,
∑n
i=1 xi  (1− q)n,
0,
∑n
i=1 xi < (1− q)n,
g is the dual function of f , and h is the majority function. We use the well-known (see, for exam-
ple, [13, Lemma 9.2]) inequality:
2nH(q)
n + 1 
(
n
qn
)
 2nH(q), (18)
where H(q) = −q log2 q − (1 − q) log2(1 − q) is the value of the entropy function at q. By inequal-
ity (18), we have
min
(
E[ f ],E[g],E[h]) 2nH(q)−1
n+ 1 .
Hence, amongst any pair of alternatives, the probability of each alternative to be preferred by the soci-
ety over the other alternative is at least η = 2nH(q)−1/(n+1). On the other hand, using considerations
similar to those of the previous example (but more tedious), one obtains
W ( f , g,h) 2n(H(q)−1)
(
1− 2n(H(q)−1))+ 2n(q−1.08) − 2n(H(q)−1) < 2n(q−1.08).
Since for all q < 1/2,
q − 1.08 < H(q) − 1,
for n = n(q, K ) big enough we have
W ( f , g,h) < 2n(q−1.08) < 2
n(H(q)−1)
(n + 1)K =
η
K
.
Therefore, substituting  = 1− H(q), the assertion of Theorem 1.3 follows.6
6 We note that a stronger bound on W ( f , g,h) for this example can be deduced from the computation in [14, Proposi-
tion 3.9].
410 N. Keller / Journal of Combinatorial Theory, Series A 117 (2010) 389–410We conclude the paper with an open question:
Question 5.9. Is this true that for small values of  , the GSWF on three alternatives in which the
choice functions are threshold functions with expectations  , 1/2, and 1−  (i.e., the GSWF presented
in the example above) has the highest probability of rational choice amongst all non-dictatorial GSWFs
satisfying the IIA condition which are -far from not having all orderings of the alternatives in their
range?
Acknowledgments
We are grateful to Tomer Schlank for helping to prove Lemma 3.5. It is a pleasure to thank Gil
Kalai for raising the questions addressed in the paper and for numerous fruitful discussions. Finally,
we thank Orr Dunkelman and the anonymous referee for valuable suggestions.
References
[1] K.J. Arrow, A diﬃculty in the concept of social welfare, J. Polit. Economy 58 (4) (1950) 328–346.
[2] W. Beckner, Inequalities in Fourier analysis, Ann. of Math. 102 (1975) 159–182.
[3] M. Ben-Or, N. Linial, Collective coin ﬂipping, in: S. Micali (Ed.), Randomness, Computation, Academic Press, New York, 1990,
pp. 91–115.
[4] A. Bonamie, Etude des Coeﬃcients Fourier des Fonctiones de Lp(G), Ann. Inst. Fourier 20 (1970) 335–402.
[5] M. de Condorcet, An essay on the application of probability theory to plurality decision making, 1785.
[6] P. Erdös, C. Ko, R. Rado, Intersection theorems for systems of ﬁnite sets, Q. J. Math. 12 (2) (1961) 313–320.
[7] C.M. Fortuin, P.W. Kasteleyn, J. Ginibre, Correlation inequalities on some partially ordered sets, Comm. Math. Phys. 22
(1971) 89–103.
[8] W.V. Gehrlein, Condorcet’s paradox and the Condorcet eﬃciency of voting rules, Math. Jpn. 45 (1997) 173–199.
[9] A.J.W. Hilton, C.E. Milner, Some intersection theorems for systems of ﬁnite sets, Q. J. Math. 18 (2) (1967) 369–384.
[10] G. Kalai, A Fourier-theoretic perspective on the Condorcet paradox and Arrow’s theorem, Adv. in Appl. Math. 29 (3) (2002)
412–426.
[11] G. Kalai, private communication, 2007.
[12] N. Keller, A tight stability version of Arrow’s theorem, preprint, 2009.
[13] M. Mitzenmacher, E. Upfal, Probability and Computing: Randomized Algorithms and Probabilistic Analysis, Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, 2005.
[14] E. Mossel, R. O’Donnell, O. Regev, J.E. Steif, B. Sudakov, Non-interactive correlation distillation, inhomogeneous Markov
chains, and the reverse Bonamie–Beckner inequality, Israel J. Math. 154 (2006) 299–336.
[15] E. Mossel, R. O’Donnel, K. Oleszkiewicz, Noise stability of functions with low inﬂuences: Invariance and optimality, Ann. of
Math., in press.
[16] E. Mossel, A quantitative Arrow theorem, preprint, 2009, available online at: http://arxiv.org/abs/0903.2574.
